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The social sciences today, Lee McIntyre argues, are in the same state in which
the natural sciences were in the Dark Ages. In the same way that religion inhibited
the progress of science and the growth of knowledge in the Dark Ages, so is
political correctness inhibiting progress in the social sciences and the growth of
knowledge today. This is why, so he argues, the social sciences do not follow the
scientific method like the natural sciences do, and are hence incapable of offering
effective solutions to pressing social problems such as crime, famine, and war.
The reason why political correctness is able to affect science in this way is our
fear of knowledge. Human beings are simply too terrified to discover unpleasant
truths about themselves, so they prevent certain hypotheses from being seriously
tested in social science research. Rather, they prefer to indulge in comforting
pseudo-scientific ideology. These are bold claims, but McIntyre’s argument to
support them is thin and weak. In particular, it fails to come close to meeting the
standards of proof by empirical evidence thatMcIntyre requires the social sciences
to meet.
The first thing that strikes a reader of this book is how few contemporary
examples of “bad science” are actually given as evidence to support the claims and
in how lile detail they are discussed. The contemporary evidential support seems
to be in inverse relation to the boldness of the claims and the sweeping nature of
the generalizations of which the book is full. One of these few examples is the
research on the relations between immigration and welfare, on which the book
spends only three (!) paragraphs (pp. 22-23). This example is supposed to show
that the social sciences practice bad methodology and are corrupted by ideology.
This is because scientists have not managed to reach agreement on this question,
and have accused each other of being politically biased. But McIntyre neither
gives any reason to think that this example is representative, nor considers other
interpretations. Perhaps this is a case of equivocation, where “welfare” means
different things for different researchers? Maybe only one side is corrupted by
ideology? Maybe some of the research is good and only some of it is bad? Perhaps
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there are similar controversies in the natural sciences as well? All of these options
are le unexplored. It would have been much beer if instead of devoting an
entire chapter (chap. 4) to retelling the old stories of Galileo and Darwin, McIntyre
had provided and critically discussed relevant contemporary examples of what he
regards as bad science.
A second weakness of the book is McIntyre’s unwillingness to deal with
evidence that does not support his claims. For example, contemporary historians
argue that the Middle Ages were not as dark as they were thought to be. They
point out many scientific, technological, and philosophical achievements of this
period, and argue that much of the bad reputation of the Middle Ages stems from
the writing of Enlightenment philosophers, who liked to denigrate everything that
preceded them. McIntyre spends half a paragraph nodding toward these claims,
but does not engage with them whatsoever. Rather, he simply concludes that
“there were no significant breakthroughs in art, science, philosophy, or literature
during this time” (p. xv). I don’t take the historical analogy to be as significant to
McIntyre’s major claim about the factors responsible for the poor state of social
science research today as he takes it. I would therefore not stress this point, except
that it is indicative of the book’s failure to meet the standards of evidence and
argument that it preaches.
In terms of a philosophical argument, the book does somewhat beer. In order
to support his claim that fear of knowledge is what ultimately holds back social
science, McIntyre provides several arguments against the view that the social
sciences are in some way inherently different from the natural sciences in ways
that prevent them from being as successful in manipulation and prediction (pp.
29-41). To be fair, he has engaged with these arguments in more depth in a previous
book. Unfortunately, he does not provide a positive argument to the effect that if
we rule out these objections, the only remaining available explanation is indeed
fear of knowledge. In addition, he does not consider the possibility that while each
of the reasons that he rules out alone is not responsible for the difficulty with
manipulation and prediction, a combination of several such reasons (which may
be more common in the social sciences than in the natural sciences), is responsible.
Last, McIntyre does not engage with philosophical arguments opposite to his own,
according to which science, and the social sciences in particular, ought to be
influenced, in someways, to some extents, and in some circumstances by ideology.
(Janet Kourany’s model of “socially responsible science” comes to mind.)
Dark Ages is an interesting read. It makes provocative claims, which deserve
to be heard in the current discourse on the social sciences. Unfortunately it is a
one-sided ideological manifesto that lacks sensitivity to nuances, and is poorly
supported by evidence. Granted, it is targeted at the general public rather than the
scholarly community, but this is not a valid excuse. There are good popular books
that manage to give sophisticated arguments and discuss complex examples in an
accessible manner. Dark Ages is just not one of them.
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